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ABSTRAK  
Ini adalah kajian empirikal yang pertama untuk mengkaji faktor penentu harga 
untuk memenangi plat kereta. Maklumat terperinci tender plat kereta seperti profil 
demografi pembida (umur, bangsa dan jantina) dan harga tender dan tawaran premium 
diperoleh daripada Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan Malaysia (RTD atau JPJ) bagi negeri 
Kedah pada 2011 hingga 2013. Data unik in membolehkan saya mengukur 
kesanggupan membayar pembida berdasarkan kepercayaan tahyul dan penglihatan 
nombor yang menarik. Nombor plat kereta membolehkan kajian menjadi lebih baik 
berdasarkan kesanggupan pengguna untuk membayar kerana nombor plat kereta tidak 
mempunyai nilai intrinsik. Lebih-lebih lagi tidak ada pasaran sekunder di Malaysia 
untuk plat kereta dipindah milik. Saya mendapati menyokong hipotesis di mana 
nombor "8" dalam plat kereta dikaitkan dengan 9.4% premium untuk memenangi 
harga tawaran manakala nombor "4" dalam plat kereta akan mengurangkan harga 
tawaran sebanyak 10.4%. Masyarakat Cina menganggap nombor "8" sebagai nombor 
bertuah kerana ia sama dengan perkataan "Kekayaan" atau "kemakmuran". "4" 
bertanda tidak baik atau bermakna dengan perkataan "mati" atau "kematian". Saya 
juga mendapati sokongan hipotesis menarik di mana plat visual menarik yang dijual 
pada premium yang ketara berbanding dengan plat lain. Sebagai contoh, plat kereta 
digit satu dan dua adalah 181% dan 42.4% lebih mahal daripada plat kereta digit 
bukan satu angka. 
 
Kata kunci: tahyul, terperinci, plat kereta, perbezaan visual, harge bida, permium 
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ABSTRACT 
This is the first empirical research examining the determinants of car plate 
winning price. Detailed car plate auctioning information such as bidder demographic 
profile (age, race and gender) and bid price and bid premium are obtained from the 
Road Transport Department of Malaysia (RTD or JPJ) for the state of Kedah during 
2011 to 2013. Capitalizing on this proprietary dataset, I attempt to quantify bidders’ 
willingness to pay for superstition believes and visual appealing numbers. Car plate 
numbers offer a good laboratory test to consumers’ willingness to pay since car plate 
numbers have no intrinsic value. More so in Malaysia where there is no secondary 
market for car plate where plate numbers are not transferable. I find support for 
superstition hypothesis where an addition of number “8”to a plate is associated with 
9.4% premium in winning bid price while an addition of number “4” to a plate 
reduces the bid price by 10.4%. Chinese community perceives number “8” as lucky 
number because it rhymes similarly to the word “prosper” or “prosperity”. “4” is bad 
for it rhymes similarly to the word “die” or “death”. I also find support for visual 
appealing hypothesis where visually appealing plates are sold at the significant 
premium as compared to other plates. For example, single and double digits car plates 
are 181% and 42.4% more expensive than a non-single digit car plate 
 
Keywords: superstitions, auction, car plate, visual difference, bid price, premium. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter discuss about the overview and background of car plate tendering in 
Malaysia, problem statement of the study, research objectives, significance of the 
study, scope and limitations of the study and organization of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Overview and Background of Car Plate Auctioning 
Attractive car plate (known as license plate in the US and Hong Kong) numbers 
could be a symbol or self-expression tool to show off power, status wealth of its 
owner. As society become more affluent, people are more willing to pay for special 
car plates which are a form of conspicuous consumption. This is because attractive car 
plates come at a premium compared to normal car plates. In Hong Kong for example, 
a license plate with a single number “9” was sold for a hefty HKD 13 million (see 
Woo et al. 2008). This reflects Hong Kong’s car owners’ willingness to pay for special 
numbers with purpose to evince his wealth.  
Car owners’ willingness to pay excessively for attractive numbers could also due to 
their superstitious believe towards numbers. There is a universal consensus among 
Chinese society worldwide that “8” is a lucky number as it rhymes similarly to the 
word “prosperity” while “4” is considered a bad number as it rhymes similarly to the 
word “die” or “death”. This is indeed the case in Hong Kong where car plates that 
contain the number “8” are pricier while none of the high-priced plates contain 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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